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REVIEW ESSAY
LIKE A SURGEON
Steven Lubett
COMPLICATIONS:

A

SURGEON'S NOTES ON AN IMPERFECT

SCIENCE.

By

Atul Gawande. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2002. Pp. x, 269.
$24.00.
I
PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THAT MAN BEHIND THE CURTAIN

Dr. Atul Gawande believes that too much information about medical practice has been "hidden, behind drapes and anesthesia and the
elisions of language."' He should know. As a senior surgical resident
at Boston's Brigham and Women's Hospital, the Harvard-trained Gawande has had plenty of opportunities to observe the delivery of
medicine in the trenches-from the remarkable successes to the
tragic mishaps. It is our good fortune that he has decided to share his
observations in the form of a truly exceptional book, Complications: A

Surgeon's Notes on an Imperfect'Science.
Gawande's theme is that medicine is subject to the same limitations as are all human enterprises. Even in an age of high technology
and rigorous science, errors are inevitable. While physicians are often
candid among themselves when it comes to confronting and correcting errors, they are far less forthcoming with their patients and
the public. Gawande's great insight is that the medical profession will
only be strengthened by increased communication and candor, even
when the truth is awkward or uncomfortable. As he put it in a recent
interview, his goal is to "'convey a sense that medicine is less perfect
than people might think it is, but more extraordinary than they
2
understand."'
The essays that comprise Complications (many of which originally
appeared as articles in The New Yorker) are divided into three sect Professor of Law, Northwestern University. I am grateful to the physicians and lawyers who provided me with helpful suggestions, comments and assistance on earlier drafts
of this essay: Peter Budetti, Shari Diamond, Jack Heinz, Marcia Lehr, Jim Lindgren,
Michelle Oberman, and Ann Warner.
I Atul Gawande, The Learning Curve, NEW YORKER, Jan. 28, 2002, at 58.
2
Stephanie Schorow, Writer in Residence: Doctor Explores His Profession in Collection of
Incisive Essays, BOSTON HERALD, June 3, 2002, at 29.
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tions-"Fallibility," "Mystery," and "Uncertainty"-each dealing with a
different sort of imperfection or difficulty in medical practice. Gawande thus explores the many ways that medicine can fall short of
expectations. Humans err, despite their best efforts. Scientific knowledge remains incomplete, leaving many questions unanswered and
unanswerable. And some situations are simply ambiguous, calling for
the exercise ofjudgment in the face of maddeningly incomplete information, often with no good solution available.
There is a straightforward elegance in Gawande's writing. He
clearly respects and admires the physicians with whom he works, but
he is nonetheless unsparing in his critique-beginning with himself.
In his very first chapter-"Education of a Knife"-he explains in aching detail one of his own failures as a first-year resident, without omitting the consequences for his patient. 3 The tricky procedure in
question was the insertion of a "central line" into the vena cava, the
main blood vessel into the patient's heart. This is a routine matter for
an experienced surgeon, but when performed incorrectly it can result
in a punctured lung.
I felt for landmarks on the patient's chest. Here? I asked with my
eyes, not wanting to undermine my patient's confidence any further .... Next, I took the three-inch needle in hand and poked it
through the skin. I advanced it slowly and uncertainly, a few millimeters at a time, afraid to plunge it into something bad. This is a

big goddam needle, I kept thinking. I couldn't believe I was sticking it into someone's chest. I concentrated on maintaining a steep
angle of entry, but kept spearing his clavicle instead of slipping be4
neath it.

A senior resident eventually had to intervene, but not before the patient was subjected to some unnecessary pain, discomfort, and uncertainty. It was not until later, when he was able to review an x-ray, that
Gawande reassured himself that he had not harmed the patient.
Later, in the most moving and revealing section of the book, Gawande describes at length his participation in a botched tracheostomy
that almost caused the death of his patient. 5 As the surgical resident
on duty, Gawande was sent to oversee the admission to the hospital of
a trauma victim. Discovering that her airway was obstructed, he realized that a breathing tube had to be inserted, but he did not wait for
help from a more senior surgeon. This proved to be the first of a
series of nearly disastrous mistakes. After several minutes of fumbling,
the patient's throat proved too swollen to accept the tube. Gawande
3
See ATUL GAWANDE,
11-15 (2002).
4
Id. at 14.
5
Id. at 48-55.
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realized that she risked brain damage or death without an emergency
tracheostomy, a procedure that he had never previously attempted on
his own. Again, however, he did not summon help. Instead, he made
the incision in the wrong place, unnecessarily severing a vein and
causing so much bleeding that it was impossible for him to see what
he was doing-even if he had known how to do it. It was only the
provident arrival of a senior anesthesiologist that saved the day, as he
ultimately was able to slip a pediatric breathing tube down the patient's throat, completely bypassing Gawande's mangled incision. 6
This incident illustrates a "central truth in medicine," he explains
at the end of the story: "[A]ll doctors make terrible mistakes."'7 From
another, less thoughtful writer, that revelation might seem like either
an expos6 or an accusation. Coming from Gawande, it is simply the
beginning of an unusually frank discussion of the realities of contemporary medicine, usually inspiring, but sometimes troubling as well.
This is a book that everyone-critics, admirers, and, most of all,
patients of physicians-ought to read. By openly confronting
medicine's inherent shortcomings, Gawande creates not skepticism or
wariness, but rather a renewed and enlightened respect for the concept of medical "practice."
Although Gawande is unflinching in identifying flaws in the delivery of medical services, many of his solutions tend to be physiciancentric, with little room for the intervention of outsiders, especially
attorneys. As an important new voice in medicine, his views are
bound to be influential in medical schools, hospitals, and beyond.
Consequently, three aspects of Complicationsshould be of special interest to lawyers and legal academics: the discussions of professional education, patient autonomy, and, of course, malpractice litigation.
II
EDUCATION OF A KNIFE

Unlike the legal academy, the medical profession regards clinical
education as a fundamental necessity. The third and fourth years of
medical school are devoted almost exclusively to clinical rotations, followed in most cases by a lengthy post-graduate residency (at least five
years for surgery) in which poorly paid neophytes continue to train
under the supervision of their elders.
The residency system has been much criticized, chiefly because of
the staggeringly long hours it demands of the residents themselves, 8
6 Id. at 53-54.
7 1I.at 55-56.
8 The American Medical Association and the Accreditation Council for Graduate
Medical Education both recently adopted recommended limits for the number of hours
that medical residents can work. But even the new, "limited" hours would seem punishing
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but there can be no doubt that it has also produced some of the best
trained physicians in the world. As a mode of professional education,
it is far superior to anything developed by the legal profession, either
during or following law school. The exacting apprenticeship required
of most physicians has no real equivalent in law practice, where formal
education is overwhelmingly theoretical and on-the-job training is
spotty at best. Even at large law firms, where the flow of work and
long hours bear some resemblance to teaching hospitals, the assignment of associates is almost exclusively profit-driven, with little similarity to the methodical exposure of medical residents to cases and the
steady, incremental development of their individual responsibilityY
Physicians are purposefully taught to practice their profession in a way
that attorneys are not.
The philosophy of clinical training in medicine is often summarized as "see one, do one, teach one," meaning that residents are expected to learn quickly as they begin practicing on real patients.
Gawande admirably confronts the central dilemma of this system. Beginners can never be as good as their more experienced colleagues,
and many medical procedures (unlike, say, legal briefs) cannot simply
be redone if the first effort is inadequate. In medicine, especially in
surgery, there is no such thing as a rough draft. Patients sometimes
pay a price for novice mistakes; such are the perils of the learning
curve.1 0 And although teaching hospitals adhere to a protocol of patient consent, many of the most meaningful disclosures are, shall we
say, glossed over when the resident actually seeks the patient's permission to proceed.
Gawande calls this "[t] he moral burden of practicing on people,"
which is never fully spelled out for patients.I a "'Not to worry. I just
assist,"' says the surgical resident to the occasional balky patient.
"'The attending surgeon is always in charge."' None of this is "exactly
a lie," Gawande explains, but it is "a kind of subterfuge."' 2 In fact, the
residents do far more than assist in most teaching hospitals. They perform crucial stages of the surgery-"hold the knife," in Gawande's
words-while the attending physician watches and offers advice.
Sometimes extra steps are added, not because it is better for the paby any other measure, as they merely restrict residents to an average of eighty hours a
week, with no more than twenty-four hours on a single shift. Even these limits can be
expanded under "special circumstances." See AMA Backs Limits on Residents' Hours, N.Y.
TiMES, June 21, 2002, at A18.
9 See generally David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms,
84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998) (describing the institutional structure of large law firms).
10
See GAWANDE, supra note 3, at 25-34.
1 1 Id. at 23.
12

Id.
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tient, but because the resident needs the practice.' 3 That is the "un4
comfortable truth about teaching."'
It is hard to imagine doing it any other way. Doctors have to be
trained, and the residency system provides both opportunity and supervision. Medicine itself advances through trial and error; there is
no perfection without practice. As an undifferentiated group, patients obviously benefit enormously from the existence of clinical
training (eventually there would be no skilled surgeons without it),
even if individuals may often receive sub-optimal treatment. The societal benefit is clear, though the individual cost is intentionally hidden.
"Given the stakes," Gawande reminds us, "who in their right mind
5
would agree to be practiced upon?"'
Gawande leaves us puzzling the conundrum that there is an unresolvable "conflict between the imperative to give patients the best
possible care and the need to provide novices with experience." 16
Left to their own devices, physicians will ensure that the necessary
knowledge is "stolen" from unsuspecting patients, "taken as a kind of
bodily eminent domain."1 7 Except, of course, when the patient is a
physician or other insider, in which case the resident's educational
needs will be deferred in favor of more seasoned hands. Gawande
tells us of a colleague who refused even to allow residents in the delivery room when his child was born. 18 And Gawande himself insisted
that a senior cardiologist treat his, son, to the disappointment of an
eager resident who was actually more familiar with the case. 19
To his credit, Gawande is willing to raise the tough issue. Choices
are given to "the doctor's child but not the truck driver's. If choice
cannot go to everyone, maybe it is better when it is not allowed at
all." 2°1 The reason is obvious, though Gawande does not advert to it.

Choices are given to doctors' children because doctors make the
rules. That will continue to be the case so long as hospitals are autonomous institutions (setting procedures and assigning personnel),
which is to say, indefinitely.
The suggestion that insiders' choice should be prohibited in the
name of social equality is, in fact, a plea for law. Gawande's own experience makes it plainly evident that virtually no parent or patient
would ever willingly renounce access to superior medical care for the
13

Id.

14

Id. at 24.

15
16

Id. at 30.
Id. at 24.

17
18

Id. at 32.
Id. at 31.

19
20

Id. at 31-32.
Id. at 33.
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sake of egalitarianism. Concerning his decision to invoke the doctors'
privilege, Gawande acknowledges that
this was not fair. My son had an unusual problem. The [resident]
needed the experience. Of all people, I, a resident, should have
understood. But I was not torn about the decision. This was my
child. Given a choice, I will always choose the best care I can for
21
him. How can anybody be expected to do otherwise?
Absolutely. No one could possibly be expected to do otherwise.
Consequently, any reform in this unfair system would have to come
from the outside. And to make the reform stick, to ensure that it
would not simply be evaded with a wink and a nudge, it would have to
be enforceable with meaningful sanctions. Otherwise, physicians
would happily continue to provide preferred care to their friends and
colleagues, while the children of truck drivers would continue to be
practiced upon.
Note, please, that it is Dr. Gawande-not me-who raises the
question of fairness in medical-practice, and who wonders whether
familial favoritism should be forbidden. I am not suggesting a regulatory scheme to govern the assignment of patients to physicians. I am
merely pointing out that physicians cannot be expected to make such
changes-however socially beneficial-by themselves, especially when
it comes to relinquishing life-and-death prerogatives. Such a change
would take serious intervention. In other words, it would take some
form of law, which is the democratic vehicle that allows the general
public to constrain powerful elites.
Gawande does not really acknowledge that creating and enforcing social policy is not the job of doctors. The distribution of benefits
is the territory of other specialists-philosophers, ethicists, legislators,
journalists, administrators, and, yes, lawyers. Though he holds a
Master's degree in public health, and though his mission is to reveal
the deep nature of medicine to the public, Gawande retains a bit of
the physician's disdain for these other professionals-lawyers, not surprisingly, being chief among them. That mistrust surfaces obliquely
in his discussion of professional training, but it is more direct when he
addresses legal concepts such as informed consent and malpractice.
III
WHOSE BODY Is IT, ANYWAY?

Medicine is both an art and a science, but it is also a social practice involving a complex set of communications and interactions between physicians and patients. This relationship has changed
dramatically in the last two decades. In the not-too-distant past, "doc21

Id. at 32.
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tors' orders" were considered inviolable. Patients were simply expected to comply, often without the benefit of the most basic
information about their own prognoses. As Gawande puts it, patients
"were regarded as children: too fragile and simple-minded to handle
the truth."2 2 It was once considered good practice, for example, to
withhold diagnoses from terminally ill patients, so they would not become disheartened (never mind the impact on their lives and relationships). Patients were subjected to powerful drugs and invasive
surgeries without knowledge of the potential side effects or other consequences. Those were the bad old days, as Gawande recognizes,
when women were routinely rushed into radical mastectomies without
23
being given the possible alternatives.
Things are better today. The patient autonomy movement has
taken hold in medical schools and hospitals, with most doctors "taking
seriously the idea that patients should control their own fates" and,
therefore, laying out the "options and the risks involved." 2 4 Gawande
credits this change to the 1984 publication of Dr. Jay Katz's important
book, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient,2 5 but this attribution is yet
another example of physician-centrism. Katz, a Yale psychiatrist and
ethicist, was surely influential in his critique of the traditional model
for medical decision making. But as Katz himself readily acknowledges, the idea of informed consent began as a legal doctrine, developed by lawyers and judges in the context of medical malpractice
litigation, during the period 1957-1972.26
Gawande agrees that patients suffered under the old paternalism,
but, along with many doctors, he remains skeptical of what he calls the
"new orthodoxy." 27 He observes that patients often make "bad decisions" and "grave mistake [s],"2'2 and that it is therefore the job of good
doctors to protect patients from their own poor choices. He is willing
to respect autonomy, but mostly when it leads to the right result.
Lawyers will immediately recognize this as the familiar tension between process and outcome. Sometimes rights and procedures have
inherent value, entirely independent of results. In law, the presumption of innocence is one such principle, essential to a free society even
though it sometimes leads to terrible verdicts byjuries. More broadly,
individual autonomy is the foundation of democracy-everyone gets
to vote, even if many ballots are capriciously cast and ill-informed.
Pursuing happiness, people may make all sorts of bad decisions-to
210.

22

id. at

23

See id. at 211.

24

Id. at 212.

25

See id. at 210-11.

26'
27
28

See JAy KATZ, Timn SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 48-84 (1984).
GAWANDE, supra note 3, at 219.

Id. at 212.
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smoke, to drop out of school, to procreate as teenagers, or to fail to
diversify their 401(k) portfolios-with no superior authority to
intervene.
No doubt, Gawande would agree that individual autonomy, in the
general sense, is an important principle. After all, one of his primary
goals is to educate the public concerning the fallibility of physicians
and the great amount of "plain old guessing" 29 that often goes into
medical treatment. He obviously expects his readers to use this knowledge to make their own medical choices.
When it comes to his patients, however, he wavers. "[A] good
physician," according to Gawande, "cannot simply stand aside when
patients make bad or self-defeating decisions. ' 30 But this, of course,
merely begs the question. What conceivable method exists for separating the good doctors (who push appropriately in the right direction) from the bad doctors (who may be influenced, as Gawande
notes, "by money, professional bias ... and personal idiosyncrasy." 3 1) ?
Alas, Gawande offers no clear way of distinguishing good physicians
from others. For example, he is in full accord with Jay Katz that bad
physicians were inappropriately overbearing in their assessment of the
now-famous case of the pseudonymous "Iphigenia Jones. 3' - 2
IphigeniaJones was a twenty-one year old woman who was found
to have a serious breast malignancy. The prevailing treatment at the
time was radical mastectomy, though a less-disfiguring lumpectomy
was also available. Survival rates were comparable, but the
lumpectomy was thought to carry a greater risk of recurrence. Jones's
surgeon was certain that a mastectomy was needed, but, as the morning of surgery approached, he had second thoughts about removing
the breast of a woman so young. He therefore took the then-heretical
approach of presenting the options to his patient and allowing her to
choose the treatment. She elected for the less intrusive surgery.
Some time later, Jones participated in a panel discussion at a medical
conference. Confronted with the idea thatJones had chosen her own
treatment, the surgical establishment was appalled. "'If doctors have
such trouble deciding which treatment is best, how can patients decide?"' complained one surgeon. Gawande points out, however, that
"the decision involved not technical but personal issues: Which was
more important to Iphigenia-the preservation of her breast or the
security of living without a significant chance that the lump would

29
30
31
32

Id. at 7.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 211.
See id. at 211-12.
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grow back? No doctor was the authority on these matters. Only Iphi33
genia was."

On the other hand, as a good physician, Gawande believes that
he must "push" his patients when the "stakes are this high, and a bad
choice may be irreversible, ' '3

4

though no doubt this was the same ra-

tionale used by the physicians who wanted to control Iphigenia
Jones's treatment. Interestingly, Gawande's illustration of this point is
one of his own breast cancer cases.
Gawande tells the story of an unnamed patient-the mother of
two and a partner in a downtown law firm, as it happened-whose
mammogram reveals "a faint group of punctate, clustered calcifica35
tions . . . that were not clearly present on the prior examination.
This worrisome feature could mean breast cancer, which calls for a
biopsy. Gawande tells his patient the news. "Despite the circumstances, and the flimsy paper gown she's in, she manages to maintain
her composure.

' 36

But she is not pleased and does not want a biopsy.

It seems that she has had three biopsies for similar readings in the
past five years, each time with a benign result. "'You just don't know
when enough is enough,
biopsy . . .. , ,,37

...

I'm not getting another goddam

This is a terrible decision on her part, Gawande believes. The
calcifications are not equivocal, and three negative biopsies do not
indicate that the fourth will be negative as well. He wants to push her,
for her own good, into agreeing to a fourth biopsy, even though the
first three have already taken out so much tissue "that the left breast is
distinctly smaller than the right one." 3 A good doctor would not let
her go, autonomy notwithstanding.
"Here's what I've seen good doctors do," Gawande explains.
"They step out for a minute and give the woman time to get dressed."
(Another begged question: Why did she have to endure the initial
consultation dressed only in a flimsy paper gown? Why should only
recalcitrant patients be granted the dignity of real clothing?) Then
the doctor holds an extended conversation with the patient, validating
her concerns but slowly breaking down her resistance. "Before a
33 Id. at 211. Many years later, it turns out that Iphigenia indeed may have made
wiser choice, even though it was contrary to her physician's professional judgment.
Gina Kolata, Lumpectomies Seen as Equal in Benefit to Breast Removals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
2002, at Al ("After monitoring more than 2,500 breast cancer patients for 20 years,
searchers have concluded that women fare just as well with an operation that removes
cancerous lump as they do by having the entire breast removed.").
34 GAWANDE, supra note 3, at 218.
35
Id. at 217.
36

Id.

37

Id. at 217-18.

38

Id. at 218.

the
See
17,
rethe
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thoughtful, concerned, and, yes, sometimes crafty doctor, few patients
will not eventually 'choose' what the doctor recommends."3 9
Writing in The New York Review of Books, Dr. Sherwin Nuland, a
professor of surgery at Yale, describes this as one of Gawande's "rare
lapses." 40 Although statistics for large numbers of patients supported
Gawande's advocacy of an urgent biopsy, the history of his individual
patient did not. Gawande convinced himself that his judgment was
correct, but in fact it was open to question. In the face of medical
uncertainty (on this, I take Dr. Nuland's word), why should the patient not have declined the fourth invasion of her breast? Was Gawande simply being a good doctor as he craftily persuaded her to
relent, or was he approaching her just as the old-timers would have
treated Iphigenia Jones (though more politely)?
The point of this is not that Gawande made a mistake-he would
be the first to concede that possibility-but rather, that he has consistently undervalued the importance of patient autonomy. To him, patient consent forms bear "the mark of lawyerdom and bureaucracy, '4 1
and ethicists can be "heartless"'42 in their insistence on patient decision making. Instead, Gawande believes patients frequently do not
want the freedom they have been given, 43 and that it can be cruel to
impose choices upon them.
He illustrates his position with another personal story, this time
involving his youngest child. Born five weeks premature and weighing
only four pounds, his daughter, Hunter, suffered respiratory failure
when she was only eleven days old. Admitted to intensive care, her
condition deteriorated and a decision had to be made. "Should she
be intubated and put on a ventilator? Or should the doctors wait to
see if she could recover without it? There were risks either way." 44 So

who should make the decision: the physicians or the parent (who, in
this case, was himself a doctor)?
In the event, Gawande deferred to the judgment of the treating
physicians. "I wanted them to decide," he says, "doctors I had never
met before." It is not that they were necessarily more competent, but
that, as he movingly explains, "[t]he uncertainties were savage, and I
could not bear the possibility of making the wrong call. Even if I
made what I was sure was the right choice for her, I could not live with
the guilt if something went wrong ....

39
40
41
42

43
44

I needed Hunter's physicians

Id. at 218-19.
Sherwin B. Nuland, Whoops!, N.Y. REv. OF Boois, July 18, 2002, at 10, 11.
GAWANDE, supra note 3, at 213.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 221.
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to bear the responsibility: they could live with the consequences, good
45

or bad."

Gawande made the right choice for himself and his family.
Hunter was kept off the ventilator and recovered, though she spent
two more weeks in intensive care. But not every patient, or parent,
would have done the same. Certainly, other individuals would prefer
to make their own decisions, shouldering the burden themselves
rather than deferring it to others. Would that be wrong? Would it be
heartless?
Upon reflection, Hunter's ordeal illustrates the virtue of autonomy, not its drawbacks. Her father was, in fact, given the option of
deciding or deferring. He made his choice for compelling emotional
reasons ("I could not live with the guilt if something went wrong," he
said) that had nothing to do with the likely medical outcome. As the
person who had to live with the result (his wife is not mentioned,
though one assumes she concurred), he was best suited to understand
its impact. Jay Katz would call this a "value judgment," of the sort that
may, depending on the circumstances, rest upon "a combination of
medical, emotional, aesthetic, religious, philosophical, social, interpersonal, and personal" factors. Different patients, Katz notes, "bring
46
different values to bear on their ultimate choice.
Still, Gawande asserts that "many ethicists go wrong .

.

. in pro-

moting patient autonomy as a kind of ultimate value in medicine
rather than recognizing it as one value among others." 47 As an alternative, he posits an ethic of "kindness [that] will often involve respecting patients' autonomy" but that may also mean "taking on
burdensome decisions when patients don't want to make them, or
guiding patients in the right direction when they do." Even when patients prefer to make their own decisions, "there are times when the
48
compassionate thing to do is to press hard."

Here, Gawande is wrestling with a straw person. What he characterizes as the "new orthodoxy" is actually an extreme view that has, at
most, a handful of adherents. No mainstream ethicist believes that
these wrenching decisions should be foisted upon unwilling patients,
or that physicians should be barred from strongly urging their recommended treatments once the options have been explained. Autonomy only implies respect for the individual's preferences, including
the very common preference that doctors make the decisions. Of
course, patients must first be advised of the risks and alternatives, even
45

hi. at 221-22.

46

KATz, supra note 26, at 96.

47

GAWANDE,

48

d. at 224.

supra note 3, at 223-24.
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if that seems lawyerly. Ultimately, process makes a difference. It is the
conversation that matters.
IV
WHEN DOcToRs MAKE MISTAKES (AND WHEN GOOD

DOCTORS Go BAD)

You would not expect a surgeon to have anything positive to say
about medical malpractice litigation. And you would be right. Gawande regards malpractice cases as worse than useless. They punish
doctors, 49 interfere with physician-patient communications, and do
50
nothing to improve care.
Gawande served as a health policy advisor during the Clinton Administration, 5 1 so the derogation of malpractice litigation might be
the only issue on which he agrees with President Bush, who recently
called for national legislation to limit malpractice liability. 52 For the
President, of course, the issue is intensely political-Bush announced
his proposal at a campaign rally for a Senate candidate. Gawande's
objections are more humane, and therefore more interesting. Uncharacteristically, though not unpredictably, he mostly adopts the
standard positions of his profession which, from a lawyer's perspective, do not tell the whole story.
Gawande's primary objection to malpractice litigation is that it
sweeps too broadly, failing to distinguish between dangerous doctors
and good doctors who simply make mistakes. Malpractice lawyers do
not concentrate on the few bad apples, he believes, given that "malpractice cases [are not] concentrated among a small group, but in fact
they follow a uniform, bell-shaped distribution. ' 5 1 A bell curve, however, might indicate nothing more than a statistically random distribution of incompetence among physicians: it reports a small number of
doctors at the extreme end of the malpractice axis, meaning that their
incidence of lawsuits is exceptionally high as opposed to those in the
fattest part of the curve, and extraordinarily high compared to the
physicians at the opposite extreme. 54 If there is indeed a bell curve
49

See id. at 55.

50 See id. at 57.
51 John Freeman, An Inside Look at PracticingMedicine, PLAIN DEALER, May 5, 2002, at
J12.
52 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Urges a Cap on Medical Liability, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2002,
at A16 (quoting President Bush as stating that "' [h]ealth care costs are. up because docs are
worried about getting sued,'" and that the liability system is "'broken and riddled with bad,
bad law"').
53 GAWANDE, supra note 3, at 56.
54 It could also mean that other litigation-generating variables are randomly distributed among physicians. For example, few lawyers will file lawsuits in the absence of extreme injuries and potentially high financial losses, circumstances that could be randomly
distributed even if incidents of underlying malpractice are not. Additionally, it is well
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(Gawande does not cite his source), then it would appear at least plausible to conclude that some bad doctors are in fact being singled out
for litigation while some very careful (or perhaps very lucky) physi55
cians successfully avoid suit.

Statistical inferences aside, Gawande is concerned that "[m]ost
surgeons are sued at least once in the course of their careers," 56 which
'5 7
he regards as evidence that "repeat offenders are not the problem.
It is certainly easy to sympathize with those physicians who find themselves on the receiving end of such lawsuits, many of which are no
doubt unnecessary or ill-founded. As a social phenomenon, however,
the high incidence of malpractice litigation is not shocking.
In 2000, the Institute of Medicine published a report entitled To
Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System58 that was intended to provide "a comprehensive approach for reducing medical errors and improving patient safety. '59 The report concluded that "[p]reventable
adverse events are a leading cause of death in the United States," and
that "at least 44,000 and perhaps as many as 98,000 Americans die in
hospitals each year as a result of medical errors." 60 These numbers
would be far higher if the report included serious but non-fatal injuries. The much cited Harvard Medical Practice Study, for example,
concluded that serious adverse events (resulting in prolonged hospitalization or disability) occurred in 3.7% of hospitalizations, over half
of which were preventable and over a quarter of which were due to
61
negligence.
With numbers like these, it cannot be considered surprising that
most surgeons-who are in a high risk field by any standard-might
face litigation at least once in their careers. Gawande himself observes
"that virtually everyone who cares for hospital patients will make serious mistakes, and even commit acts of negligence, every year." 62 Inknown that factors such as poor interpersonal skills and inept record keeping often encourage litigation.
55 Gawande gives us the example of one "bad apple," an orthopedic surgeon who
repeatedly and inexcusably injured his patients. It appears, however, that this doctor was
indeed singled out by repeated malpractice complaints, becoming one of the most frequently sued physicians at his hospital and, at least anecdotally, refuting Gawande's claim
of random distribution. See GAWANDE, supra note 3, at 90-91, 97.
56 Id. at 56.
57
Id.
58
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda
T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
59 Id. at 17.
t0 Id. at 26.
61
Id. at 30. Other studies have found even higher rates of preventable adverse events.
See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews et al., An Alternative Strategy for Studying Adverse Events in Medical
Care, 349 LANCET 309, 309 (1997) (finding that at least 17.7% of patients had at least one
preventable adverse event).
62
GAWANDE, supra note 3, at 56.
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deed, he goes further. Discussing the prevalence of physician
burnout, and its potentially dangerous effect on unsuspecting patients, Gawande notes that "'problem doctors"' are not aberrations.
In fact, "[t]he aberration may be a doctor who makes it through a
forty-year career without at least a troubled year or two."' 63 He adds,

"estimates are that, at any given time, 3 to 5 percent of practicing phy64
sicians are actually unfit to see patients."
Whatever the cause, there is obviously plenty of malpractice to go
around, although that does not necessarily mean that the current litigation system is the best way to deal with it. Lawsuits are expensive,
time consuming, and uncertain. They distribute resources badly, with
too much money going to attorneys and not enough to victims. Even
if litigation works as intended (on any level), its primary objective is
compensation, not systemic improvement.
No physician looks at the current litigation system without longing for a better way to address medical mistakes. Gawande offers the
alternative model of the Morbidity and Mortality Conference (M & M
conference), where doctors can talk candidly about their errors, if
only among themselves. Usually held once a week at most teaching
hospitals, the M & M conference allows doctors to "gather behind
closed doors to review the mistakes, untoward events, and deaths that
occurred on their watch, determine responsibility, and figure out
what to do differently next time.

'65

As Gawande sees it, the M & M

conference is everything that a malpractice lawsuit is not. Most importantly, it focuses on future improvement rather than past recrimination, thus motivating physicians to expose their errors in order to do
better rather than hide them in the hope of avoiding responsibility.
M & M conferences are exceptionally good at helping responsible
doctors locate and rectify their problems without fear of liability. That
is why forty-nine states have enacted statutory medical peer review
privileges (the sole exception is NewJersey), which protect communications in settings such as M & M conferences. 66 As Gawande extolls
it,
[T]he M & M is an impressively sophisticated and human institution. Unlike the courts or the media, it recognizes that human error is generally not something that can be deterred by punishment.
The M & M sees avoiding error as largely a matter of will-of staying
sufficiently informed and alert to anticipate the myriad ways that
things can go wrong and then trying to head off each potential
63

Id. at 94.

64

Id.
Id. at 57-58.
See INSTITUTE Or MEDICINE,

65

66

supra note 58, at 119.
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problem before it happens. It isn't damnable that an error occurs,
67
but there is some shame to it.
Alas, the M & M conference is no panacea. Gawande himself,
fewer than thirty pages later, gives us a chilling account of a dangerous doctor who simply ignored the weekly M & M conferences, and
whose colleagues stood by for years while patients were crippled and
disfigured. The doctor, whom Gawande calls Hank Goodman, was an
orthopedic surgeon whose early career showed great promise. His
techniques were up to date, he reveled in his work, he won teaching
awards at the hospital, and he performed more procedures than anyone else in his group practice. After several years, however, things
began to go wrong. He started to cut corners and ignore patients,
making poor decisions time and again.
In one case, Dr. Goodman refused even to examine a patient who
appeared to be suffering from a painful infection following knee surgery. "'Ah, she's just a whiner,"' he told his assistant. By the time the
patient finally sought the opinion of another doctor, the infection had
consumed all of the cartilage in her knee, destroying the entire joint.
The bone was so severely damaged than even a knee replacement was
impossible; the only viable option was to fuse her knee .6 8 In another
case, Goodman put the wrong size screw in a patient's broken ankle
and refused to change it when the patient complained of pain. In a
similar case, he used an improperly long screw that actually eroded
through the flesh and skin in the patient's arm. In a fourth case, he
mishandled the surgery for an elderly man's broken hip, resulting in
almost complete dissolution of the bone. A horrified surgeon who
reviewed the case had this to say about it: "' [Goodman] just wouldn't
do anything. He literally wouldn't bring the patient into the hospital.
He ignored the obvious on X rays. He could have killed this guy the
way things were going.' "69
If ever there was a doctor who needed urgent, effective peer review, it was Hank Goodman. But it did not happen. Although Goodman's "botched cases became a staple of his department's Morbidity
and Mortality conferences," 70 nothing was actually done to prevent
him from continuing to operate on unsuspecting patients. There
were a few "Terribly Quiet Chats," in which Goodman was urged to
seek help, but matters simply drifted along for "an unconscionably

67

GAWANDE,

68

Id.at 90.
Id. at 91.

69
70

Id.

supra note 3, at 62.
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long time," 7' from 1990 until late 1995. For all of the damage he was
72
doing, his colleagues remained "uncomfortable aboutjudging him."

In fact, Goodman even stopped attending the M & M conferences, though who could blame him? "Various people warned him,
with increasing sharpness, that he would be in serious trouble if he
didn't start showing up at M & Ms," but he ignored them. 73 Here is
how Gawande describes the efficacy of the Mortality and Morbidity
system in reining in a bad doctor: "After a year of [skipping M & Ms],
the hospital board put him on probation. Through it all, he was operating on more patients and generating ever more complications. Another whole year went by" before Goodman's operating privileges
74
were finally suspended.
Gawande sees both dishonorable and honorable reasons for this
lax attitude toward dangerous colleagues. The "dishonorable" reason
is disengagement. It is easy to do nothing, and much harder to summon the energy and commitment to take stern measures. No doubt.
But Gawande's so-called "honorable" reason is even less satisfying. He
says that "no one really has the heart for it." Indeed, "[w]hen a
skilled, decent, ordinarily conscientious colleague, whom you've
known and worked with for years, starts popping Percodans, or becomes preoccupied with personal problems, and neglects the proper
75
care of patients, you want to help, not destroy the doctor's career."
These words may not fit everyone's definition of an honorable
reason for ignoring life-threatening problems, but it is undoubtedly
an accurate description of the reality at most hospitals. It is also the
reason that injured patients consult malpractice lawyers, rather than
wait for the M & M system to provide a comprehensive solution. Attorneys (and their clients) recognize, if surgeons do not, that it is usually unreasonable to expect institutions to police themselves-and it
may simply be irrational to do so when lives are at stake.
Consider the problem of preventable post-surgical infections,
which, according to an estimate from the Centers For Disease Control, may needlessly kill as many as 75,000 Americans annually (other
estimates are even higher).76 One might think M & M conferences
could effectively address this issue, since an astonishingly high percentage of deadly infections appear to be "the result of unsanitary facilities, germ-laden instruments, unwashed hands and other lapses. '77
71

Id. at 97.

72

Id.

73

Id.
See id. at 97-98.
Id. at 95.
See MichaelJ. Berens, Infection Epidemic Carves Deadly Path, Ci. TRIB.,July 21, 2002,

74
75
76

at 1.
77

Id.
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Sadly, the opposite seems to be true. Even with full knowledge that
improved sanitation would reduce mortality, many hospitals and physicians have failed to take simple remedial steps. "For years, we've just
been quietly bundling the bodies of patients off to the morgue while
infection rates get higher and higher," said Dr. Barry Farr, the presi78
dent of the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America.
The Chicago Tribune reports that Bridgeport Hospital, a major
trauma center and teaching hospital in Connecticut, experienced an
infection rate of 22% among cardiac surgery patients during the late
1990s. An investigation revealed that "up to half of doctors, primarily
surgical residents from Yale University, did not wash their hands
before entering the operating room. ' 79 Other doctors wore their surgical scrubs home and returned to the hospital the next day, without
changing their dirty scrubs before entering the operating room. This
conduct was clearly observable to others, but it went unchanged even
as infection rates soared. At one point, in fact, the hospital's doctors
voted against testing all patients for infection because it was not "cost
effective."8 0
This information came to light, and corrective measures were employed, only after the hospital Was sued. Post-litigation, infection rates
have been reduced to near zero.8 ' This is not to say that lawyers
should get undue credit for the improved hospital sanitation, but
rather to observe that the hospital (and its surgeons) failed to respond
89
to a life-threatening crisis, M & M conferences notwithstanding.
Gawande's other complaint about malpractice litigation is that it
corrupts the physician-patient relationship:
The deeper problem with medical malpractice suits is that by demonizing errors they prevent doctors from acknowledging and discussing them publicly. The tort system makes adversaries of patient
and physician, and pushes each to offer a heavily slanted version of
78

Id.

79
80

Id.
Id.

81

Id.

82 Thousands of internal records documented the extent of the problem, but the
hospital strenuously resisted their disclosure. The information was made public only by
virtue of an order from the Connecticut Supreme Court. See id. But even that was not
quite the end of the secrecy. The Chicago 7ibune article discussed the cases of two women
who contracted post-surgical infections at Bridgeport Hospital-one died after over 400
days of hospitalization, and the other was effectively crippled for life. Bridgeport Hospital
responded by suing the surviving woman and the widower of the deceased for breach of
the confidentiality provisions in their malpractice settlements. The lawsuit sought damages
and an injunction against publicly discussing "'the terms, conditions and existence of any
and all settlement agreements regarding Bridgeport Hospital."' After two days of bad publicity, however, the lawsuit was dropped. See David M. Herszenhorn, Hospital Lrops Legal
Action to Stem Tide of Bad Publicity, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2002, at B5.
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events. When things go wrong, it's almost impossible for a physi83
cian to talk to a patient honestly about mistakes.
Forgive me if I appear cynical, but is it really fair to blame mal-

practice lawyers for physicians' unwillingness to tell patients about
mistakes? Was there ever a golden age, before rampant malpractice
litigation, when doctors communicated freely with their patients,
openly acknowledging errors and confronting mistakes in the spirit of
humble cooperation? I don't think so. And neither does Dr. Jay Katz,
who wrote The Silent World of Doctor and Patient in the 1980s, long
before the current flood of malpractice cases. If anything, the days
before the malpractice explosion were characterized by less communication from doctors, who then routinely refused to acknowledge even
the possibility of uncertainty.8 4 The great likelihood, I am afraid, is
that doctors, being human, are simply reluctant to admit mistakes to
their patients, and instead seize upon any available rationalization.
Today, the excuse is malpractice liability. In the old days, it was the
patients' own welfare-they would not heal as rapidly, it was said, if
85
they lost confidence in their physicians.
In any event, contrary to Gawande's supposition, there is considerable evidence that malpractice claims actually diminish when docIncreased
tors are open and candid about their errors.
communication is widely seen as reducing malpractice litigation, not
inviting it.86 The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations recently adopted a policy requiring hospitals "to proGAWANDE, supra note 3, at 57.
See KATz, supra note 26, at 165-206. Katz observes:
The history of medicine is the history of physicians' caring but silent devotion to what they believed their patients' best interests dictated. Doctors
were rarely heard to invite patients to share the burdens of decision with
them. Instead, the voices heard were those of doctors' hopeful and reassuring promises, however truthfully, evasively or deceptively made, of doctors'
orders, however gently or harshly uttered, and of patients' compliant assent, however cheerfully or resentfully given.
Id. at 207.
Moreover, in the United Kingdom, where litigation rates are a fraction of what they
are in the United States, physicians remain disinclined to discuss medical errors with their
patients. See Charles Vincent et al., Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patientsand Relatives Taking Legal Action, 343 LANCET 1609, 1611 (1994).
85
Katz tracks the history of this philosophy from ancient times to the present, noting
that Hippocrates advised "concealing most things from the patient while you are attending
to him." KATz, supra note 26, at 4 (quoting HIPPOCRATES, DECORUM 297(W. Jones trans.,
Harv. Univ. Press, 1967). More recently, physicians have complained that "informed consent endangers patients' mental and physical life." Id. at 27. In summary: "The importance that physicians have attributed throughout medical history to faith, hope and
reassurance seems to demand that doctors be bearers of certainty and good news. Therefore, the idea of acknowledging to patients the limitations of medical knowledge and of
doctors' capacities .. .is opposed by an ancient tradition." ld. at 189.
86
See Wendy Levinson et al., Physician-PatientCommunication: The Relationship with Malpractice Claims Among Primary Care Physicians and Surgeons, 277 JAMA 553, 553-59 (1997).
83
84
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vide an 'honest explanation' of medical errors to patients and their
families."' 7 While patient safety is the primary reason for the new regulation, which went into effect on July 1, 2001, supporters of the rule
further note that candor also tends to reduce malpractice claims.
"'You save money by doing this,"' said Dr. Dennis O'Leary, head of
the Commission, "'and the patient's family is appreciative that people
were honest."'
In this regard, the Commission is following the lead of the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky, which in 1987
adopted a policy of "extreme honesty" in reporting medical errors.
Patients are informed immediately about mistakes and the hospital's
office of risk management actually assists patients with filing claims
and locating attorneys. "'If we're liable, we say so,"' explained
pulmonologist Steve S. Kraman, the hospital's chief of staff.8 9 Kraman
further noted that "'I[i]n the vast majority of cases, people don't stay
angry when they realize they're being told the truth and are being
treated respectfully.' "90 The implementation of this policy actually resulted in a substantial decrease in malpractice costs, with the hospital's average payment per case now only about one sixth of the
average for the entire Veterans Administration system. 9 '
A study published in the British journal Lancet found that as many
as 39% of malpractice plaintiffs would not have filed suit if their doctors had sincerely apologized for their errors instead of stonewalling.9 2
The authors noted that lawsuits were prompted when patients "were
disturbed by the absence of explanations, a lack of honesty, the reluctance to apologise, or being treated as neurotic." 93 A study published
in the Journal of the American Medical Association likewise reported that
at least 24% of malpractice plaintiffs were motivated by perceived
cover-ups. In the total sample, 13% of the plaintiffs reported that
their physicians "would not listen," 32% said that the doctors had not
talked openly, and 48% believed they had been misled.9 4 Yet another
study similarly found that patients are more likely to sue if they report
"feeling rushed, feeling ignored, [and] receiving inadequate explana95
tions or advice.
87
Health
88
89
90

91
92
93
94

Politics & Policy-Medical Errors: New Medicare Policy Mandates Disclosure, American
Line, Jan. 2, 2001, WESTLAW, Allnews File.
Janet Wells, Hospitals Must Disclose Doctor Errors, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 24, 2000, at Al.
Mark Crane, What to Say ifYou Make a Mistake, MED. ECON., Aug. 20, 2001, at 26, 28.
Id.
See id.
See Vincent et al., supra note 84, at 1612.
Id.

Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors that Prompted Families to File Medical Malpractice
Claims FollowingPerinatalInjuries, 267 JAMA 1359, 1359 (1992).
95 Levinson et al., supra note 86, at 554. See Gerald B. Hickson et al., Obstetricians'Prior
MalpracticeExperience and Patients'Satisfactionwith Care, 272JAMA 1583, 1583 (1994); see also
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Ultimately, Gawande's prescription seems to be that medical malpractice litigation should be limited so that the medical establishment
can take steps to reduce preventable injuries. Needless to say, there is
another way to look at the problem. Perhaps hospitals should enhance patient safety so that malpractice cases will decrease. Heaven
knows, there are many things wrong in the world of malpractice litigation, but lawsuits definitely have their place when it comes to addressing, and redressing, medical errors.
V
FINAL. CUT

None of this is meant to detract one bit from the considerable
virtues of Complications. It is a terrific book by any measure. Atul Gawande did not set out to please physicians (he mentions that he expected to dismay many of his colleagues), so it is little surprise that he
would not please lawyers either. As an iconoclast, perhaps he might
even consider this an additional success.

Hickson et al., supra note 94, at 1359, 1583 (noting that "[f]amilies expressed dissatisfaction with physician-patient communication"); LaRae I. Huycke & Mark M. Huycke, Characteristics of PotentialPlaintiffs in Malpractice Litigation, 120 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 792, 798
(1994) (finding that dissatisfication with modern health care motivates patients to frequently contact law firms); Ann J. Kellett, Comment, Healing Angry Wounds: The Roles of
Apology and Mediation in Disputes Between Physicians and Patients, 1987 Mo. J. Disp. RESOL.
111, 130 (urging an examination of causes leading to medical malpractice lawsuits); Amy
B. Witman et al., How Do Patients Want Physiciansto Handle Mistakes?, 156 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2565, 2567 (1996) ("[A]n overwhelming majority of patients want the physician
to acknowledge the error in some way.").
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